Boas's memorial to Brinton is a statement of devotion, an homage to a colleague who inspired and defended a collective scholarly enterprise-an "us" with which Boas clearly identified. Yet his devotion has gone entirely unremarked in histories of American anthropology, and this is not just a matter of archival oversight. Although Brinton has long been dismissed by historians as a racist, he also began a momentous new movement in American anthropology, a movement that Boas himself would bring to fruition. Yet to understand the affiliation that linked Boas to Brinton, it will be necessary to think in new ways about anthropology at the turn of the twentieth 1 Franz Boas, "Daniel Garrison Brinton," Globus: Illustrierte Zeitschrift für Länder-und Völkerkunde, 76, no. 11 (1899): 166. century and the social, moral, and discursive world within which this nascent discipline found itself.
The importance of his example for the development of American anthropology cannot be overstated. For many years, his voice was the only one that called us back from the excessive specialization that had begun to pose a threat to the general scientific point of view in itself. If anthropology is to find a firm footing in America, it is thanks in no small part to the labors of the deceased.
century and the social, moral, and discursive world within which this nascent discipline found itself.
For a long time now, scholars have agreed that Boas's relationship to Brinton was one of deliberate and successful supersession. Boas, the story goes, displaced Brinton and his methods on the way to becoming the preeminent anthropologist of his time. 2 Little evidence exists to suggest that Boas and Brinton understood their relationship in this way, but this has rarely bothered historians of anthropology. They relate the narrative of Boas's supersession of Brinton as part of a larger and more profoundly moralized story about how the American anthropological establishment learned to stop using race as an explanation for human difference and human behavior and to rely instead on the "modern, relativistic, pluralistic anthropological approach to culture." 3 These two narratives have become so thoroughly conflated, with Brinton playing the racialist foil to the rise of the Boasian culture concept, that it has become all but impossible to understand why Boas would want to single out Brinton as the "lone voice" who put American anthropology on a "firm footing."
The difficulty facing us can be traced back to Boas himself. Recent research by Lee Baker has shown that by the turn of the twentieth century Boas had come to see the fight against racism as the decisive struggle of his age. That struggle required that he deal with Brinton-a powerful, indeed founding, figure in the profession who was also a vocal segregationist and anti-words-that different forms of human experience (including the experience of scientific knowledge) were constituted.
On the basis of this understanding, which came to be known as the "expressiveconstitutive" dimension of language, Brinton departed from his American contemporaries. He elaborated in the 1880s a methodological critique of the ascendant "naturalistic school" of linguistic anthropology, a critique that he would soon apply to all those scientists who had fallen under the sway of "the positive philosophers, who insisted that events and institutions must be explained solely from the … objective world." 6 It was due to Brinton's attempt to conduct the human sciences from a first-personal perspective-an intervention that began with his Humboldtian reconceptualization of language as "expression"-that Boas credited him with putting their common discipline on a "firm footing," notwithstanding the fact-which Boas also saw-that Brinton never ceased to defend a theory of "psychic unity" that contradicted, even fettered, his most promising insights.
Boas took over Brinton's philosophy of expression and reformed it by abandoning its naturalistic ontology of the human psyche. One outcome of this work of rectification was a thesis that might be read as a leitmotif of Boas's entire career. "To the ethnologist," Boas wrote, "the most trifling features of social life are important because they are expressions of historical happenings," and not, as Brinton had thought, because those facts are "expressions of the general consciousness of Humanity." 7 What is the difference between "history" and "the consciousness of Humanity," and why did it matter to Franz Boas? And why, at the same time, was it important to him to retain the concept of expression? If we can come to some understanding of the stakes of this highly abstract disagreement-which is also a moment of concurrence and continuationwe can begin to make sense of Boas's Globus memorial and, more importantly, reconstruct how
Boas built upon Brinton's "firm footing" a viable discipline, universal in scope and possessed of a moral vision of knowledge as a collective practice of symbolic self-becoming.
The mode of expressive enlightenment in which Boas and Brinton both took part, far from being limited to the pages of journals, was an ethical attitude distributed far and wide across turn-of-the-century American culture. Anthropologists participated in it, but they were not its inventors. What we risk failing to see, if we consider Boas's understanding of human language solely from the perspective of Euro-American intellectual history, is that circulating media like the Yavapai physician Carlos Montezuma's activist newspaper Wassaja and the NAACP's Crisis, edited by W. E. B. Du Bois, also drew upon and fulfilled a "philosophy of expression" that bore a family resemblance to, but was not wholly descended from, the kind of disciplinary knowledge put into practice by Boas himself. 8 Instead of positioning Brinton and Boas as adversaries, stand-ins for race and culture, we can understand both better when we recognize their mutual imbrication in this wider discursive field-a rhetoric of expression that charged the cultural politics of race with philosophical urgency, inspiring a social project to understand the symbolic activities of humans and make use of them to bring into being new transcultural futures.
I. "Speak!"
Although the term "expression" has a long Euro-American history, it took on a new significance following the emergence in Europe of a self-consciously modern form of subjectivity that the philosopher Charles Taylor has referred to as the "disembedded" or "buffered" self. This new kind of self found itself possessed of new "powers of moral ordering" that enabled and encouraged an attitude of holding oneself apart from the natural world and the extra-human influences that, in a previous era, had penetrated the "porous" self as part of that world.
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The newness of this situation manifested itself in a new kind of philosophical inquiry into the history of the human faculties, an inquiry whose classic question-How did human language originate and develop from pre-history to the present?-inspired a richly variegated genre of speculative history. This genre of philosophy was about more than language considered objectively. By inquiring into the origins of language, the philosophes of the eighteenth century were engaged in a process of self-interpretation, a coming-to-terms with the mysterious sources of their own peculiar form of experience. 18 In the generation leading up to Brinton's entrance onto the scene, its most up-to-date articulation was William Dwight Whitney's theory of languages as "institutions." For Whitney, to say a language was an institution meant that it was collectively invented or "instituted," and not discovered. This was a significant departure from Condillac's conception of language as a naturally endowed faculty, but it reproduced his view that language had a purely instrumental role in human betterment. Whitney saw languages, like "steam-engines," "tubular-bridges," and "Brussels carpets," as an "instrument of thought, the machinery with which the mind works; an instrument by which its capacity to achieve valuable results is indefinitely increased, but which, far from being identical with it, is one of its own products; with and by which it works with freedom."
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Central to this understanding of language is the supposition that the human mind can abstract itself from the flow of experience, bringing the "freedom" of a third-personal perspective to bear upon itself. It is only from this detached standpoint that human freedom can be imagined to exist in a purely "negative" relation to its products-indeed, so much so, that it would seem to diminish human freedom to argue, as Herder had done, that language is in some way constitutive of our "feeling of what to do." Whitney dubbed linguistics a "historical" discipline because its object of study was a human invention; yet by construing language as an invention-a product, an Ergon-he did what Humboldt said the historian should never do. He considered historical phenomena in abstraction from experience. "The facts of language,"
Whitney famously remarked, "are almost as little the work of man as is the form of his skull."
20
One can understand why the founder of semiology, Ferdinand de Saussure, whose linguistics course was premised on the regimentation of the diachronic and experiential by the synchronic and systematic, spoke of Whitney as "l'Américan Whitney que je révère." coherent formal system that obeyed natural laws, Brinton saw each language as a "thought world in tones" shaping our experience such that it couldn't be analyzed in a purely objective fashion.
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Whereas Whitney cautioned his readers against "metaphysical" theories of language coming out of Germany-theories that could only constrain human freedom by misidentifying it as one of its "institutional" creations-Brinton insisted that language, "which will perish only when intelligence itself, in its highest sense, is extinguished," was indistinguishable from human cognition and thus from freedom itself.
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Brinton made his neo-Humboldtian project relevant to late-nineteenth-century Americans by emphasizing dimensions of language that could only be characterized from the first-personal point of view of a historical subject. These dimensions had been utterly effaced by naturalistic linguistic methods, which approached language as an Ergon-not as a creation of God, necessarily, but as something that existed in nature as a complete and coherent system. To say language is complete and coherent is to assume that there exist clear boundaries that separate it from other entities in the order of Nature. It was owing to Brinton's sense of the inadequacy of this parceling-out of the precincts of Nature that Boas would later remember him as having "called us back from the excessive specialization that had begun to pose a threat to the general scientific point of view in itself."
And yet, despite Brinton's avowed allegiance to the Humboldtian way of looking at language, in key respects he departed from the Humboldtian historian's task of refining "our sense of acting on reality." Boas put his finger on this problem in his obituary, where he wrote that "Brinton's strengths and weaknesses were conditioned by his intellectual disposition, which 22 Brinton, "Philosophic Grammar," 311. Brinton's study of subjectivity entailed a radical decontextualization of the self. He held that everything important about our experience is reducible to the contents of our consciousness.
"Men," Brinton wrote, "do not live in material things, but in mental states; and solely as they affect these are the material things valuable or valueless." 27 Neither our unconscious bodies nor the world beyond the buffered self can provide us with any moral guidance about the kinds of beings people essentially are. For Brinton, the most successful strategy for coping with the "milieu" beyond the mind was to withdraw from it entirely. "The progress of man," he declared,
"is his progress of gaining independence from nature, of making her forces his slaves and not leaving them his masters." 28 The metaphor of "mastery" here is not unrelated to Brinton's investment in scientific racism. The downfall of the non-white races, Brinton proposed, was that they remained too embedded in environments that, over time, corrupted their bodies and minds.
"The peculiar traits of races can with entire propriety be considered pathological; for the more completely they adapt a group to one environment, the more do they unfit it for any other."
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Brinton's inclination to blame the environments that non-whites inhabited for their racial "pathologies" thus worked hand-in-hand with his investment in a certain picture of what it is to be a buffered self, a sum of "mental states" utterly cut off from one's environment, the more cut off the better.
The longer one spends with Brinton, the more difficult it becomes to determine whether the ethics of belief Brinton deployed to police his theory of "psychic unity" is best interpreted as an inconsistency in a fundamentally Humboldtian way of looking at the world, or whether Brinton's entire "philosophy of expression" was just a way of sugarcoating the deflationary 27 Ibid., 14 28 Brinton, "The Factors of Heredity and Environment in Man," American Anthropologist 11, no. 9 (September 1898): 271-77, 276. 29 Ibid., 275.
pessimism that followed from his erection of an unbridgeable "psychic" barrier between the world and the self's experience of it. Ultimately, the best way to make sense of Brinton is to see him as attempting to rise to the challenge of self-interpretation that Taylor associates with modern selfhood, a project that is as much about coping as it is about coherence. Undoubtedly, Brinton was attuned to something unsatisfying about the intellectual world of his day. He saw in the Humboldtian tradition a theoretical solution to some of the problems posed by that world; but as a matter of practice, the third-personal, policing attitude gave him a clearer sense of moral purpose.
Boas, in "The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology," recognized this attitude in Brinton when he interpreted his predecessor's notion of psychic unity as a consequence of having adopted the position that "anthropological studies must be confined to researches on the laws that govern the growth of society." 30 By maintaining that stance, Brinton left open a possibility-a way out of his "confinement"-that he himself was not able to realize.
The question left open for Boas was, What else could anthropology be?
II. Expressions of Historical Happenings
The epochal insight that Boas brought to American anthropology-the insight that, as we shall shortly see, made him a great if sometimes unwitting affiliate of the many projects of collective self-determination taking shape at the outset of the twentieth century-was that knowledge could be a means of affiliating oneself with the world and its people. In formulating this insight, Boas drew on many intellectual sources, including experiences with indigenous collaborators. 31 His first major statement of it was "The Study of Geography" (1887), written shortly after Boas's return from Baffinland, in which Boas concluded of the "effort to delineate the earth's surface" that "every step that brings us nearer the end gives ampler satisfaction to the impulse which induces us to devote our time and work to this study, gratifying the love for the country we inhabit, and the nature that surrounds us." 32 As Matti Bunzl has argued, Boas showed himself in this essay to be engaged in a scholarly project closely aligned with that of that of Humboldt and Herder. But this isn't at all what Boas wanted, for himself or anyone else. Boas shared in the characteristically modern aspiration to advance science, an endeavor which he believed "helps free us from the errors of the past." 38 Boas's understanding of scientific progress was somewhat unusual, since he did not think the correction of scientific error developed from the replacement of bad "explanations" with better ones. Instead he followed Goethe in holding that "a single action or event is interesting, not because it is explainable, but because it is true." 39 If one approaches a phenomenon with an idea that it is a piece of data to be explained, one has already ceased to act as a world-oriented scholar and become something else: a "naturalist" governed by an internal "aesthetic impulse." 40 Unlike Brinton, Boas wanted to get back in touch with the phenomena of the world. He sought not only explanations but a heightened feeling of connectedness.
As in the case of Brinton, Boas's idea of the scholar's proper relation to the world connected to his understanding of language. In his "Introduction" to the Handbook of American Indian Language, Boas grounded his career-long inquiry into human symbolic activity in a 37 On the influence on Boas of "Counter-Enlightenment skepticism," see Bunzl, e.g. 56. This view is implicit in George Stocking's influential formulation of the Boasian culture concept; he writes in Race, Culture, and Evolution that "Boas's thinking on ethnic diversity was rooted in the same soil" as Herder's "organic diversitarianism" (214 dimensions. And yet, despite our modern aspiration to cognitively master our experience, Boas argued that secondary understandings are subject to contingencies of unconscious experience that are largely beyond our control. "Even our scientific views, which are apparently based entirely on conscious reasoning," Boas explained, are formed "under the influence of strong emotions." To square the "Introduction" with "The Study of Geography," our views are responsive to the "affective impulse" governing our experience, according to which the self finds itself ineluctably drawn into the world without knowing why ahead of time. 42 In order for one's secondary understandings to become better attuned to one's environment, one has to get into the right relation not just with the world, but with oneself. One has to recognize oneself as the kind of being whose picture of the world is changeable.
Boas's theory of secondary understandings showed the attitudes of scientific experts to be subject to the very same "impulses" as the people whom they typically studied. This motivated his departure from Brinton on the question of how to respond to modernity and of who could take part in that response. In "The Aims of Ethnology," Boas wrote that "the same kind of struggle that the genius has to undergo among ourselves in his battle against dominant ideas or dominant prejudice occurs among primitives and it is of particular interest to see in how far the strong individual is able to free himself from the fetters of convention. enlightenment, a freeing of humanity from superstition. But in order to understand the modes of relation to the people Boas persisted in calling "primitive"-that is, colonized people-that his version of that project made possible, it is important to grasp the term "enlightenment" in its full dimensionality.
One understanding of the Enlightenment, Enlightenment with a capital E, holds that it was a period of intellectual and cultural history. Those who see Boas as part of the "CounterEnlightenment" tend to assume that he looked backwards upon the Enlightenment as a discrete period of history that was already complete, or that had proven itself incapable of completing itself, such that a new kind of inquiry, the Counter-Enlightenment, had to be initiated. It's true Growing up in our own civilization we know how we ourselves are conditioned by it, how our bodies, our language, our modes of thinking and acting are determined by limits imposed on us by our environment. Knowledge of the life processes and behavior of man under conditions of life fundamentally different from our own can help us to obtain a freer view of our own lives and of our life problems.
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In turning back to Herder and Rousseau, Boas's purpose was not to locate himself within a grand narrative of intellectual history, but to specify a problem that emerged in his own experience.
Boas saw in these eighteenth-century figures the germ of an account of "our life problems" as "historical" in the particular sense with which he used that term, the sense of being solicited by a world toward which the self has to get in the right relation.
Enlightenment, then, can also be understood in the lower-case, not as a closed moment but as a continuing process, a coming-to-terms with history through the cultivation of a certain style of being a buffered self. We find a cognate understanding expressed in Michel Foucault's later formulation of enlightenment as an "ethical attitude" as a mode of relating to the present times and to oneself as a modern subject. "To be modern," Foucault writes, "is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration. …This modernity does not 'liberate man in his own being'; it compels him to face the task of producing himself." 46 It is this style of being a buffered self, this reckoning with today that culminates in the discursive constitution of a self with "a freer view,"
that I want to understand as expressive enlightenment.
This form of expressive enlightenment-self-enlightenment through affective exchange with the world surrounding the buffered self-could only be achieved through an interaction with a world that was always already social, a world comprised of other selves possessed of other secondary explanations, all-Boas hoped-striving to get themselves attuned to the world in a way that gratified their "affective impulse" toward it. For Boas, expressive enlightenment was a mode of discursive affiliation that would connect the members of the human community with time. Toward the end of his life, he wrote, "It is my conviction that the fundamental ethical point of view to be taken is that of the in-group which must be expanded over the whole of humanity. This leads naturally to the conclusion that the individual must be valued according to his own worth and not the worth of a class to which we assign him." 47 To recognize individuals according to their "own worth" is to presuppose in those individuals themselves a capacity for self-production. Boas did not hesitate to say that this was the way he looked at the world and the way he sought to empower others. "My whole outlook upon social life is determined by the question: how can we recognize the shackles that tradition has laid upon us?" he wrote. "I consider it the duty of those who are devoted to the study of social problems to become clear in regard to these questions and to see to it that through their influence the intellectual chains in which tradition holds us are gradually broken."
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Boas looked for allies in this project of enlightenment wherever he could find them, in other societies (where he found "primitives" engaged in the "same kind of struggle that genius has to undergo among ourselves") as well as in his own. To Boas, an enlightened attitude toward oneself seemed the only condition of modern belonging worth endorsing at a time when "secondary understandings" were creating new barriers between people. Boas, like Herder, saw that the modern creation of "the whole of humanity" followed from the unavailability of older forms of attachment. "On the whole in the history of mankind as the size of groups has increased, their solidarity has been weakened," he wrote, "and with that the rights of the outsider have been recognized." 49 What makes up for the weakening solidarity of these expanding groups is a mode of belonging facilitated through discourse circulating among those "outsiders," those who never subscribed to the in-group's traditions or who expressively defined themselves in opposition to them.
A solidarity constituted through the circulation of discourse requires peculiar protocols of mutual recognition through which members of expanding in-groups can manifest themselves to one another across time and space. One such protocol of mutual manifestation, for those committed to expressive enlightenment, was the term expression itself. As Foucault observes, Kant understood the Enlightenment slogan-Sapere Aude!-as a Wahlspruch or "a heraldic device, that is, a distinctive feature by which one can be recognized, and…also a motto, an instruction that one gives oneself and proposes to others." 50 Near the end of the nineteenth century, expression became the Wahlspruch of a new mode of enlightenment. Brinton and Boas both had a role to play in bringing this to pass; whatever their theoretical differences, they used the term to convey a shared intention to deal with the world, and one's ethical relation to oneself as a knower of that world, in a new and more receptive way. From Brinton's slogan that the "facts of ethnology are expressions of the general conscious of humanity" through Boas's maxim 49 Ibid. 50 "What is Enlightenment?" 35.
that "the most trifling events are significant because they are expressions of historical happenings," we can witness the gradual refinement of a specific style of being a buffered self, one designed to cope with and contest a rival style of knowledge-making that looked upon the world as Ergon.
III. Beckoning
Expressive enlightenment was not merely a form of scholarly knowledge, a Boasian strategy to build upon Brinton's "firm footing" a viable scientific discipline. It was a relational form of becoming that gratified the "affective impulse" directing the inquirer outward, into affiliation with the world and its people. This activity of imagining new cross-cultural affiliations made a difference in twentieth-century America, but to appreciate its significance we need to look past the precinct of anthropology. Beyond the human sciences, the mode of expressive enlightenment was also discovered-simultaneously, as it were-by poets, philosophers, politicians, and social activists, who developed it in a diversity of inflections. Across American society, the Wahlspruch of expression, and the modern attitude of self-production that it signaled, facilitated the affiliation of disparate individuals who resolved to become themselves by speaking out in public.
We can begin to appreciate the breadth of this collective manifestation by briefly considering the field of philology, a field that, like ethnology, underwent a momentous transformation in the last decades of the nineteenth century. One can trace this transformationclosely connected to the emergence of the modern discipline of literary studies-precisely by following the etymology of "expression" in the published works of critics and rhetoricians around the turn of the twentieth century. Prior to the rise of the English department in America, "expression" was a synonym for enunciation. It was part of a scholarly discipline through which teachers taught students to speak according to established rules of conduct. As late as 1887, J. H.
Gilmore, Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Rochester, could hope to find an audience for his Outlines of the Art of Expression, a "little book," as described in its Introduction, that "has grown, in the author's class-room, out of an attempt to supplement the defective early training of his pupils ...
[with] a knowledge of those particular elements of Grammar which are distinctively characteristic of the English tongue." Gilmore's vision for the progress of his students' knowledge had nothing to do with the process of self-becoming I've been calling "expressive enlightenment." Speech was always to be governed according to elocutionary protocols authored by experts who had foretold all possible scenarios of decorous utterance.
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By the 1880s, the days of Gilmore's brand of prescriptive rhetoric were numbered.
According to an influential cadre of ambitious young professors who taught English, not Latin, and who counted themselves as proponents of "modern" philology, the study of a literary text was to be imagined precisely as a mode of enlightenment. When Columbia professor Joel Spingarn, a leader of this new movement, insisted that great works of literature ought to be seen as exemplifying an "art of expression," he explained at length that this phrase meant not that works of literature conformed better than other texts to certain prescribed "Rules," but that the meaning of literature depended on its exemplary effect on the life of a reader. Like Brinton and Boas, Spingarn traced this understanding of expression across the Atlantic and backward in time to thinkers like Goethe, Herder, and Hegel. It was with them in mind that he wrote, in his 1910
lecture "The New Criticism," that the basic objects and aims of literary inquiry were fundamentally expressive:
What has the poet tried to do, and how has he fulfilled his intention? What is he striving to express and how has he expressed it? What impression does his work make on me, and how can I best express this impression? The aborigines of America have never been in a position to express themselves. The game of "the survival of the fittest," competition of life in God's appointed way, "by the sweat of the brow," have been too one-sided. It has been an awful unfair play to speculate and weaken, to satisfy your aesthetic propensities.
To judge a race relative to their standard we must put ourselves in their place; better still, be one of them.
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One could be forgiven for mistaking this for a rumination of Franz Boas, yet no evidence exists to suggest that Montezuma ever read a word Boas wrote. Montezuma's opposition between "expression" and enlightened self-interpretation on the one hand ("to judge a race relative to their standard we must put ourselves in their place") and, on the other, an "aesthetic" picture of an orderly universe subject to natural laws ("'the survival of the fittest'…in God's appointed way") shows that he had found his own way to distinguish between "affective" and "aesthetic" speech, Energeia and Ergon. Throughout his career, Montezuma consciously modeled for his audience this expressive attitude-an attitude that he thought could help his people come to terms with the predicament from which, as he put it in another speech, "we Indians are struggling in the dark to find a way out." new community. Montezuma gave his newspaper his name because he observed no distinction between his subjectivity and its discursive manifestation. He was committed to an ethical attitude of expressive enlightenment that required him to continually reconstitute himself in response to the exigencies of the present.
The verse form of "I have stood up for you" communicated this. Wassaja wanted to be a poet but, like Walt Whitman, he wrote most of his poetry in such a way that it sounded like prose when read aloud. Even today we recognize "I Have Stood Up For You" as a poem not because of its rhyme or meter but because when we look at the page we can see white space between the line-breaks and capital letters at the beginning of each line. Wassaja's identity was bound up with the look and feel of print discourse, with speech spread over great distances into the hands and minds not only of associates but also of strangers. This is one way in which Montezuma modeled, in the content and form of his discourse, an ethical attitude committed to an ongoing project of self-production.
In the pages of Wassaja, we can begin to see what it means to say that the mode of solidarity engendered by expressive enlightenment is fundamentally discursive. It is made for a world in which the voices of individuals circulate among strangers: "the wrong concept of us Indians which the public entertains, is a phantom which can be cleared away only by education and by our personal contact with the masses of the country," Montezuma wrote in Wassaja in 1916. "It therefore behooves us to stand together and to teach the public differently." 59 The implication is clear: if Indians don't start speaking for themselves in view of a broader public, then they can't be free. Like Boas, Montezuma understood freedom to consist in the revision of secondary understandings-the "phantom" caricature of Indian-ness that "must be cleared the disciplinary critique of "excessive specialization" and "positive knowledge" that Boas developed on the "firm footing" provided by Brinton's philosophy of expression. It was through his own commitment to this scientific project that Boas was able to imagine anthropology as a collective emergence from the thralldom of tradition-not the thralldom to nature Brinton feared-and thereby imagine into being a global community comprised of those who would make it their personal responsibility to think and speak for themselves.
For both Boas and Montezuma, the main obstacle facing the global community they envisioned-the "secondary understanding" to be overcome-was the widespread conception of human history as an unending race war. This was the understanding to which Montezuma referred when he spoke of "the game of 'the survival of the fittest,' competition of life in God's appointed way, 'by the sweat of the brow.'" In place of this prevailing understanding Boas and Montezuma elected to put forward not a new master theory of human history-"WASSAJA is not writing a thesis," Montezuma wrote in 1916-but a practice: a new form of expressive solidarity mediated by circulating discourse.
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To observe Boas's unknowing affiliation with Montezuma is to see Boas from the global perspective for which he so often searched, and thereby, perhaps, to discover a broader set of communities in which he moved. This may run against Boas's own sense of his intellectualhistorical singularity, but in another way it confirms his intuition that exemplary forms of subjectivity, even of "genius," can be recognized across the parochial boundaries between disciplines and endeavors. I want, in closing, to draw attention to two insights that this perspective brings into view.
The first is that expressive enlightenment cannot be accounted for by tracing the transmission of knowledge among Euro-American elites. We must look backward from Boas to Brinton, Humboldt, and Herder, but we must also look sideways to figures like Spingarn and Montezuma-to Boas's contemporaries-in our effort to understand the pressures motivating Boas's reformation of anthropological practice and the ideas those pressures generated. The second is that this sideways perspective on Boas can de-center the telos of the expanding "ingroup" that emerged as his hope for modern cross-cultural solidarity. As Montezuma and the
Society of American Indians demonstrate, expressive enlightenment constitutes a subject who is a "multiple being," a being who makes manifest his responses to local concerns within a particular discourse that addresses itself to a universal audience. And a new and still nobler and more important work awaits us: to demonstrate that there is a higher and more significant bond; the relationship of created things, one with another, and their inseverable kinship and relation with that Sovereign Power and Intelligence, whom some men reverence as God, and whom other men call the Unknowable, the Unseen, but whom Philosophy regards as the Totality of all things. And the American Indian race should be found in advance in this important labor.
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There is something undeniably paradoxical about the way this universalistic effusion culminates in a statement of ethnic pride. Then again, there is something paradoxical about the situation of the Boasian knower, whether modern or "primitive," who can only create an enlightened global in-group by wrestling with the misunderstandings furnished by his local discourse community. In both situations, the enlightened subject is expressed as a multiple self whose location lies at the center of plural solidarities of very different scales. Montezuma and the social movement he helped bring into being can thus help us see something that Boas himself might not have realized: that the mediation of local concerns in the public discourse fostered by expressive enlightenment reproduces the same tension between in-group and out-group to which it claims to offer a solution.
Today, there exist a number of scholarly vocabularies for discussing phenomena like expressive enlightenment that exist in both local and trans-local, or "glocal," social space. 68 The history of expressive enlightenment from Herder to Montezuma reminds us of the anxiety such glocal discursive phenomena produce for individuals. Much like Herder's warning to his wouldbe Socrates that he set out from "weak and indeterminate beginnings," Montezuma's assertion that the modern American Indian could never be "reconciled to his situation" must be read as an expression of the modern self writ large. The phenomenon of expressive enlightenment reveals the extraordinary motivation such irreconcilable situations provide for the constitution of discourse, and of subjects themselves.
